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Abstract Taking inspiration from a distinction Kant drew between the way power is
organised, and themanner in which it is exercised, this analysis directs attention to the
consolidation of an autocratic style of politics in Europe. The co-existence between an
autocratic style of rule and preserved democratic organisation of power, which pre-
vents a legitimation crisis, is explained in terms of an altered legitimacy relationship
(or social contract) between public authority and citizens. This ultimately allows a
discrepancy to emerge between public authority’s increased capacity for policy action
and reduced social responsibility for the consequences of that action.
Keywords Democratic deficit ! European integration ! European Union !
Legitimation crisis ! Political responsibility ! Social justice
The neophyte, baptized in smiles …
Old in illusions turned to acritudes.
(Dylan Thomas [1930–32] 2003)
The European Union’s fate has been, of late, rather more bewailed and bemoaned
than celebrated. After the brief jubilation upon uniting the continent by embracing
the ten new democracies of East and Central Europe in the eastern enlargement of
2004 and 2007, the EU has been painted as being in either crisis or decay. ‘The
neophyte, baptized in smiles’, seems to have grown ‘old in illusions turned to
acritudes’, to echo the poet. Europe’s afflictions have been usually attributed either
to the deficient democratic nature of the EU decisional bodies (the so called
‘democratic deficit’) or to eroding national sovereignty, as member-states are ceding
their authority in matters ranging from customs duties, monetary and, most recently,
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fiscal policy, to passenger flying rights and fishing. Most recent critiques have
centered on the perennial tension between capitalism and democracy—a perspective
from which Europe’s current predicament appears to be rooted in policies (at
national and EU level) that have given the upper hand to the economic logic of
market justice over the democratic logic of social justice.1
Instead, taking inspiration from a dichotomy that Immanuel Kant articulated
between the way power is organised and the manner in which it is exercised, I will
offer, in what follows, a diagnosis of the EU’s state of political health that is
alternative to the common democracy- and sovereignty-based acrimonies. I will
begin by elaborating a distinction between responsible and responsive rule in order
to position conceptually my subsequent discussion of the changing relationship
between public authority and citizens and the implications this carries for
contemporary European societies. This will allow me eventually to offer an
explanation of why the economic logic of market justice is currently trumping the
logic of social justice with relatively little public resistance.
Responsible Versus Responsive Governance
In one of his rare political writings, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1903
[1795]), Kant noted that progressive politics is neither a matter of morality, nor is it
a matter of the form of sovereignty (say, a democracy, or a monarchy) and its
territorial range (local, national, global) but, above all, it is a question of the manner
in which power is exercised. Kant distinguished between a despotic and a
republican (in the contemporary sense of ‘liberal’) style of rule and placed his faith
in the latter, noting that democracy, as a form of sovereignty, is perfectly compatible
with the despotic exercise of power.2 Critiques of the European Union, whether they
centre on democracy or on sovereignty, are located within the conceptual range of
concerns with the organisation of power: democracy is a matter of institutionalised
rule of the citizenry; sovereignty—a matter of the particular territorial set up in the
exercise of governance functions. This focus on the structure of governance
obscures the dimension of what Kant conceptualised as forma regiminis—the mode,
or manner, in which power is exercised, irrespective of the way it is constituted.
Focusing attention on the mode of rule (rather than on the structuration of
government) would direct thinking about the state of the European Union not in
terms of where sovereignty resides (with nation-states or with the trans-national EU
central decisional bodies), nor on how much democratic input into decision-making
it allows, but on the manner in which power is exercised.
Kant’s insight into the superior importance of the manner in which power is
exercised allows us to draw, for the purposes of this analysis, a further distinction
1 For a particularly judicious analysis of this type see Streeck (2011).
2 Kant (1795, Section II, Art. 1) builds a typology of states around two axes: (1) the form of sovereignty
(forma imperii)—autocracy, aristocracy, democracy; and (2) the mode of rule (forma regiminis)—
republican or despotic. Being the opposite of ‘despotic’, the term ‘republican’ here denotes a liberal (in
our common usage of the term) style of rule. Thus, the correlation of forma imperii to forma regiminis




between responsible versus responsive rule. ‘Responsible rule’ denotes a style of
governance in which public authority assumes responsibility for the consequences
that its policies have on society. Responsible rule can take the shape of a variety of
constitutions (from monarchy to a republic), with the marked exception of
theocracy, where responsibility is outsourced to a divinity. Responsive rule, in
contrast, denotes a style of governance in which public authority formulates policy
as a response to popular preferences, but does not assume responsibility for the
consequences of policy thus enacted. Democracy (be it direct or representative) is
the epitomy of responsive rule.
In the political history of Western Europe, the concept of responsible rule
predates considerably that of democracy and the rule of law. Historically, a
relationship of mutual dependence between public authority and subjects was
established within the absolute monarchies of sixteenth- and seventeenth- century
Europe as, in the course of mobilisation for war, ruling elites developed an interest
in promoting the welfare of the populations they taxed in order to finance wars
(Tilly 1975). Early modern statehood in Europe thus developed as a protection game
(Stinchcombe 1997, p. 387)—a game in which the political ethos of social
responsibility became inscribed into the instrumental logic of state building. Thus,
the practice of responsible governance predated that of responsive governance; the
latter came only with the very gradual establishment of democracy in the course of
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A mediating type of governance is that of
‘accountable rule’, typical of the seventeenth- and eighteenth- century constitutional
governments (monarchies and republics), where the political ethos of responsibility
is stabilised by institutional mechanisms of accountability (such as checks and
balances, and the rule of law).3 While the devices of rule of law and democracy
consolidated responsible rule by forcing it to take the shape of accountable and
responsive government, they are in themselves not generative of responsible rule.
Drawing on the above-elaborated distinction between responsible and responsive
governance, in the remainder of this paper I will argue that the malaise that is ailing
Europe today is neither a matter of an alleged democratic deficit, nor of
inappropriate division of sovereignty among levels of governance, but a matter of
a pathological style of rule—the pathology of a discrepancy between the growing
powers of public authorities and the decrease in their responsibility, which
eventually makes it possible that the rituals of responsive (democratic) rule be
mobilised to give legitimacy to socially irresponsible, autocratic governance.
Europe Today
The phenomenon of an emergent autocratic style in the exercise of power, whose
sources of authority remain nominally democratic, is recently captured in the
controversial poster advertising the play ‘Europe Today’—a Serbian-Bosnian-
3 Thus, Montesquieu (1748) advocated the rule of law and the division between executive, legislative and
judicial powers for their capacity to hold central authority accountable for its actions, thus ensuring that
power is used responsibly. He considered the British constitutional monarchy as the perfect embodiment
of such rule.
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Croatian-Slovenian-Romanian production directed by the Bosnian theatre director
Haris Pasˇovic´, performed around Europe in the spring of 2011.
A poster advertising the play ‘Europe Today’ of the East–West Theatre Company (Sarajevo), written by
Miroslav Krlezˇa, directed by Haris Pasˇovic´. Source: Slovenian National Theatre: http://www.sng-mb.si/
en/all-other-events/miroslav-krleza-europe-today/. Copyright permission granted by the East–West
Theatre Company
The poster depicts an SA-style trooper, whose armband and the flag he carries
feature the 12 stars of the EU, instead of the swastika and the German eagle. One
might dismiss such a portrayal of Europe as democratically constituted dictatorship
by attributing it to the famed maverick posture of the Neue Slowenische Kunst art
movement, or generally to the deliberate flippancy of East European intellectuals.4
However, it can also be read as conveying a phenomenon that needs to be taken
4 The Neue Slowenische Kunst art movement is a political art collective established in 1984 in Slovenia,
then still part of communist Yugoslavia. Its signature visual device consists in re-appropriating
totalitarian kitsch in order to provoke a clash among meanings brought to their logical extremes. Its most
prominent exponent, the band Laibach, is an avant-garde music group known for their deconstruction of




seriously—the formation, in recent years, of a political rule in Europe that is
autocratic in style, coexisting with the institutional structures of democratic
governance. The emergency appointments by EU authorities of two heads of
European governments (Lucas Papandreou in Greece and Mario Monti in Italy) in
November 2011, and tasking the newly appointed leaders to enforce (rather than
negotiate) policies of austerity in their countries, does add some credence to Kant’s
thesis of cohabitation between a democratic organisation of power and despotic
manner of its exercise.5
This peculiar mode of rule, I will argue in what follows, has taken shape in the
course of merging dynamics at hand in the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ (post-communist)
Europe over the past 20 years—two mutually enhancing trajectories of transforma-
tion blending into a common political fate. Before tracing these two trajectories, in the
next section I will complete the framework of conceptualisation by introducing the
notion of a legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens—a
relationship that, by configuring the social contract, mediates the interaction between
the logic of economic justice and that of social justice, and thereby determines the
degree to which the operative logic of capitalism is susceptible to public scrutiny.
The Missing Crisis of Capitalism and the New Social Contract
My empirical entry point into a diagnosis of Europe’s current malaise is the alleged
crisis of capitalism or, rather, the missing crisis of capitalism. In the midst of the
recent global financial meltdown, we have heard much emphatic talk about the crisis
of capitalism. However, what narratives about this crisis tell us is no more than this
the financialisation of the economy has created a crisis for capitalism—some
difficulties in the creation of profit (such as deficient credit) which have by now
been overcome. Moreover, these difficulties, and the social misery they have
inflicted, have not triggered a crisis of the system’s legitimacy. ‘We are not against
the system but the system is against us’,6 announced a slogan of the indignados—
the peaceful demonstrators who occupied public spaces across Spain in the early
summer of 2011.7 Yet this cry of protest is ambiguous—it is more an appeal to tame
the system, make it more inclusive, rather than to subvert or overthrow it.
Like the protests of the Spanish indignados, the citizens’ outrage in Greece
against the conditions that the EU and the IMF imposed for the financial bailout of
the government, the Occupy Wall Street movements, and the looting that ravaged
English cities—all in the summer and autumn of 2011—have signalled a growing
popular discontent with the outcomes of the socio-political system—mainly with the
5 Note that these appointments do not alter the constitutional set-up of power in Italy and Greece—the
institutional structure of public authority retains the features of parliamentary democracies founded on the
principle of popular sovereignty.
6 As quoted in Minder (2011).
7 Los Indignados (The Indignants) is a social movement of mostly young people, who staged protests in
Spain close to the local and regional elections held on 22 May 2011. At the focus of their demands is a
solution to endemic youth unemployment, while their creed centres on a rejection of the current political
and economic system, including the institution of representative democracy; they appeal for grassroots
participatory democracy.
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dramatically uneven allocation of wealth and increasing social exclusion. However,
while these movements express, in their distinct ways, public frustration with the
socio-economic system of neoliberal capitalism, they rarely put into question its
validity or evoke an alternative. These calls are at their best appeals for ‘fixing’ the
system and making it more inclusive and, at their worst, exasperated cries of
frustration and fear. If democratic elections are any indicator of prevailing
preferences, the most recent round of national elections in Europe have confirmed
that capitalism has considerable popular support. In the midst of the rampant
economic crisis, the vote in Europe has gone to the right; support to left parties has
been at a historic low, while support to xenophobic populism is rising.8
Most importantly, what is absent is a broad societal, cross-ideological coalition of
forces mobilising to protect society from the market, similar to the counter-
movement against free markets that Karl Polanyi, in his The Great Transformation,
observed to be taking shape in the early twentieth century. At the time, a consensus
between the left and the right emerged on the need to constrain markets, a consensus
which propelled the post-war welfare states. Instead, we now have governments,
irrespectively of their ideological allegiance, running to the rescue of financial
capital and big business, and implementing austerity programmes to reassure capital
markets, while society bears this with relative equanimity, despite the increasing
price it is paying in terms of cuts to social insurance, to basic services for the most
disadvantaged, general impoverishment and growing precarity. Social frustration is,
instead, directed mainly into xenophobia. How can this be explained?
While we have been busy debating the crisis of capitalism, capitalist democracy
(as a system of social relations and political rules) has metamorphosed itself into a
new form, which the most recent economic meltdown consolidated, but did not
cause. This new form is marked by a particular social contract (or legitimacy
relationship) between public authority and citizens, which enables a particular style
of rule, which I will attempt now to elucidate. Before I proceed, let me clarify the
concept of a legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens, which
will be a focal point in the subsequent analysis of Europe’s political health.
The legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens is constituted
by what Claus Offe has called ‘the legitimate and legitimacy-conferring functions of
the state’, functions concerning ‘the state’s capacity to manage and distribute
societal resources in ways that contribute to the achievement of prevailing notions
of justice’ (Offe 1985, p. 5). These are functions (such as defence of territorial
integrity, wealth redistribution, safeguarding order) that citizens expect from public
authority and therefore condition their obedience on the effective exercise of such
functions. Importantly, these functions may vary in time and across space; their
8 Centre-right parties (parties for which economic liberalism is a key ideological tenet), which could be
expected to be discredited by the economic crisis that neoliberal economic policy triggered, were elected
to power in Spain, Finland and Denmark in 2011; in the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands in 2010; in
Luxembourg and Germany in 2009—to limit examples to the ‘old’ European Democracies. Incumbent
centre-left parties, despite avowed ideological sentiment, have been implementing austerity measures of a
neoliberal nature for the sake of appeasing global financial markets. Although the tide appears to be
turning with the French presidential elections in March 2012, the consensus between the centre-Left and
the centre-Right on the inevitability of further neo-liberal structural reform remains intact—whether these




evolution throughout the history of the modern state has altered the social contract
among citizens, and between them and the central governing authority. The
legitimacy relationship, in turn, determines the thematic scope of the agenda of
public debate: most importantly, it determines which social practices are politicised
and thus become an object of contestation, and which ones remain outside the notice
of politics and, thus, beyond the remit of critique and contestation.
What were the parameters of the social contract in European societies in the
second half of the twentieth century? Let us recall that, after the Second World War,
European societies on both sides of the Iron Curtain operated within a political logic
that attributed to the state, rather than the market, the primary responsibility for the
material welfare of citizens, dressing that responsibility in the terms of citizens’
social rights. In drawing this deliberately sweeping generalisation, I do not imply
that differences among countries did not matter;9 yet, I aim to emphasise that the
very legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens in the framework
of the post-war welfare state was built around social rights, and the corresponding
responsibility of the state to secure them. Such rights (from employment guaranteed
by public policy, limitation to working hours, unemployment and health insurance,
etc.), and the positive duty of the state to provide them, discerned the range of the
social responsibility of the state, which was institutionalised in a variety of national
modalities of welfare state in Western capitalist democracies. It had been the social
responsibility of public authority under bureaucratic socialism that had generated
much of the legitimacy of the otherwise oppressive regimes in Eastern Europe.
Although social transformations in the new and the mature democracies of
Europe have followed very different trajectories over the past 20 years, these
trajectories have come to converge into a new legitimacy relationship between
public authority and citizens—a new social contract. The turning point for Eastern
Europe was the collapse of communism in 1989–1990; the turning point for
Western Europe was the coming into force of the Single European Act in 1987 and
the putting into place of the single market (the free movement of goods, services,
capital and people) in 1993. The accession of ten of the post-communist societies in
2004 and 2007 merged the two processes. Let me now trace these two distinct logics
of transformation and their mutual enforcement.
Eastern Europe After the Fall of Communism
The story of Eastern Europe is the fate of nurturing capitalism within a non-liberal
framework of politics (what Kant would characterise as a despotic forma regiminis).
Here the features of the model emerge in three consecutive stages. In the first
stage, the collapse of the communist regimes in the late 1980s was marked by the
disappearance of the left ideological perspective. Dissident mobilisation in the
decades preceding 1989 did not have a strong economic component and free-market
rhetoric was marginal. (The 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe began as a broad
9 These differences are documented in the ‘varieties of capitalism’ and ‘types of welfare state’ literature,
which issued, respectively, from the pioneering works of Peter Hall and David Soskise (2001) and
Esping-Andersen (1990).
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rejection of the modernist projects of human conquest over society and nature,
which were seen to be embodied as much by the communist states as by the capi-
talist democracies.) At this early stage the strong presence of central public authority
in the administration of society lost legitimacy, as this presence was experienced as being
oppressive. With this, however, the social responsibilisation of the state—that is, the
responsibility of the state for securing social rights, also vanished.
The second stage, that of democratic transition immediately following the
revolutions, was marked by elite-based political mobilisation and personalistic form
of policy-making. Political elites, rather than parties, were actors of political
mobilisation and candidate-centred forms of politics predominated, ultimately re-
asserting the autocratic style of policy-making that had been characteristic of the old
regime.10 Moreover, as the dissidents’ agenda of abstract human emancipation
disappeared (together with the dissidents), economic liberalisation rapidly took centre-
stage, embraced equally by the communist-successor parties as it was by the plethora of
new political formations. Va´clav Havel’s admonitions against both the communist and
capitalist forms of technological modernity (within his allegedly utopian ‘politics of
authenticity’) were superseded by Va´clav Klaus’ derision of the ‘paternalistic’ welfare
state in Western Europe and his eulogies of unregulated free-market capitalism.11
The third stage—that of democratic consolidation in the course of preparation for
EU membership—stabilised the two features that had emerged previously: that of
the autocratic style of policy-making and the hegemony of free-market ideology. On
the one hand, the social and political reforms were driven by the blueprint of EU-
membership conditionality and carried out by the political elites that were the key
interlocutors to the Brussels administration. On the other hand, the socio-economic
substance of the new social contract was dominated by the idea of free and open
markets. In the course of EU accession, the development of competitive market
economy was imposed as a condition for EU membership, alongside that of
democracy and the rule of law. Significantly, the stress was placed not simply on
free-market economy, but on competitive economy, as the aspirant countries were
required to develop ‘capacity to withstand competitive pressures’ (stipulated in the
so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for EU accession).12 It is important to note that
economic liberalisation and the demise of the cradle-to-grave welfare state were
embraced not on the basis of ideological preference but, rather, as constitutive (and
ergo—unquestionable) elements of the social transition.
The EU-membership requirements related to liberal constitutionalism—rule of
law, independent judiciary, civil and political freedoms—were a powerful
10 I had observed this tendency to be emerging already at the time of my involvement with the student
strikes at Sofia University in 1989–1990; see Azmanova (1992).
11 English translations of some of Havel’ and Klaus’s programmatic texts are available in O’Sullivan
(2004).
12 The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ (the rules defining a country’s eligibility for membership in the EU) as
adopted at the 1993 European Council stipulate: ‘Membership requires that the candidate country has
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic




corrective to the autocratic style of politics in post-communist societies. However,
this corrective was fragile and temporary. For instance, Monica Macovei, the
Romanian Minister of Justice from December 2004 to April 2007, who pushed
through the reform of the judicial system, was dismissed only a few months after
Romania joined the EU. Some of the laws she had introduced were changed or
suspended. In a similar vein, the authoritarian turn in Hungary and Bulgaria,
together with political corruption, has been well reported in the international press
and in EU policy reports. Overall, the weakness of constitutional government, the
autocratic style of policy-making by ruling elites, and lack of responsibility for the
social agenda (from the perspective of social justice that marks left politics), have
become characteristic features, be it in varying degrees, of the post-communist
societies of Eastern and Central Europe.
Western Europe After the Single Market
I now turn to the fate of the mature democracies in the ‘old’ Western Europe. The
starting point in reconfiguring the legitimacy relationship between public authority
and citizens was the redefinition of state-market relations during the ‘golden
decades’ of neoliberal capitalism—the 1980s and 1990s. The policy agenda at that
time was no longer centred on redistribution and macroeconomic policy that had
been the cornerstones of the Keynesian economic philosophy underlying the
European welfare state. Instead, public policy increasingly began to be centred on
(1) internal market integration via lifting barriers to competition within the EU; and
(2) improving EU competitiveness in the global economy.
The shift of policy priority in favour of free markets can be traced back to the
establishment of the so-called ‘single market’ in the early 1990s.13 Under its impact,
economic integration within the EU began to be interpreted in the terms of free
market—allegedly to ensure the freemovement of goods, capital, people and services.
With this move, the protection of the disembedded market became the core function
of the EU decision-making bodies, and social policy became subordinated to it.
The immediate impact here of 1989 was to bring globalisation to the doorstep of
Europe. The geo-political opening after the end of the Cold War thus made global
competitiveness a highly salient factor in policy-making. This shift is explicit in the
EU policy agenda since the turn of the century, as the stress on global
competitiveness has become more acute in the transition from the Lisbon Strategy
of 2000 (which pledged to make the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 2010) to its revised version adopted in
2006, and the current Agenda 2020.14 The objective of global competitiveness has
generated a trans-ideological policy consensus, embraced by capital and labour, and
13 The Single European Act, signed by EU leaders in 1986, aimed to integrate member-states economies
into a ‘single market’ by 1992, thus engendering a space of free movement of goods, services, capital and
persons (known as ‘the four freedoms’). The treaty came into effect in 1987, and the single market was
effectively established in 1993.
14 The Lisbon Strategy (also known as the Lisbon Agenda) was a 10-year action plan for economic
development adopted by EU-member states’ leaders at the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000. It
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enforced by public authority both at the level of European Union institutions and at
the level of member-states. As part of strategies for international competitiveness,
governments at state- and EU- level, and across the ideological spectrum, have been
undertaking action to enhance market efficiency, mostly by active liberalisation and
deregulation of the economy. Tellingly, trade-union activity has changed its nature,
as liberalisation and deregulation policies, accepted under the threat of losing jobs,
have become a central object of concertation, giving rise to what Wolfgang Streeck
(1984) and Martin Rhodes (2001) have described, respectively, as ‘supply-side
corporatism’ or ‘competitive corporatism’. Within this new consensus standard
distributional issues related to social justice become secondary, as employee rights
are made subordinate to the dictates of competitiveness in the global economy and
the risk is shifted from the employer to the employee.
The State: More Powerful, Less Responsible, Invariably Legitimate
In the course of these dynamics, the role of political authority in Europe has altered.
Public authority (at all levels of governance) has undertaken ever more policy action
to intensify wealth-production, but less and less action to manage the social costs of
growth-generating public policy. This is particularly evident with regard to social
policy in the European Union.
EU integration has reduced the policy-making powers of member-states in
welfare provision, while EU institutions over the past decade have increasingly
started to taken action in this field.15 This shifting balance between member-states
and the EU in itself is not alarming; it is not even interesting. The important
question is not where policy-making authority is allocated, but what the nature is of
social policy resulting from the re-allocation of responsibility between states and
EU’s central policy-making bodies. In this regard, three elements are noteworthy.
First, in the course of shifting responsibility from state to EU level, there is less
and less public authority in charge of welfare provision. This is the case because the
retrenchment of the state is not matched by an equal increase of policy action at EU
level. In other words, what the states are losing in terms of capacity to secure social
rights is not matched by an equal increase in the responsibility of the EU to
safeguard these rights.
Second, since the adoption of the Single European Act, economic integration
within the EU has been invariably interpreted in the terms of free-market capitalism
(while in principle open markets are not synonymous with free markets).16 The
logic of EU integration, dominated by economic freedoms, endows the raison
d’E´tat of the European Union with the substance of raison d’e´conomie, thus
Footnote 14 continued
was updated and re-launched in 2006. Upon its expiration, the European Council in June 2010 adopted a
new European competition and development strategy for the period until 2020, known as ‘Europe 2020’.
15 For a detailed outline of this process see Leibfried (2010).
16 The former concerns export policy, the latter—the state of domestic product- and labour-markets.
Thus, one can imagine an integrated market to emerge among EU member-states as a shared economic




marginalizing social reason.17 This has resulted in a radically liberal form of welfare
provision: one marked by subordination of social policy to free-market policy
priorities, a race to the bottom in social protection.
Third, the accession of the post-communist states to the EU has increased
competitive pressures on the labour-markets in the old members of the EU. EU
enlargement to the East has put downward pressure on employment standards (both
in terms of level of social protection and wage rates), creating a race to the bottom
in social protection codified in recent legislation as well as in rulings of the
European Court of Justice. An example at hand is the Directive on Services in the
Internal Market adopted in 2006.18 It opened the possibility for companies and jobs
to relocate to the low-cost and less regulated economies of Eastern Europe, thus
creating the threat of social dumping—the use of foreign labor to undercut wages
(the ‘Polish plumber’ threat).19 The European Court of Justice has treated this
matter in the Viking and the Laval cases, which resulted in legalising the minimum
standards of labour protection, effectively transforming the principle of equal pay
for equal work into minimum pay for equal work.20 Thus, the general public in the
old member-states has started to see the inflow of labour from the new member-
states as a threat of social dumping.
Overall, as a result of the transformative dynamics reviewed above, the range and
nature of the responsibility of public authority has changed, which has affected the
style of governance. At both state and EU level, public authority is undertaking ever
more action to enhance market efficiency (for the sake of global competitiveness),
with dramatic increase in social risk, but this same public authority has ceased to
assume responsibility for the generated risk. Rather than a retrenchment of the state,
we have the new phenomenon of increase in the power of governing bodies (and
their capacity to inflict social harm), while their responsibility for the social
consequences of policy action decreases. This discrepancy between power and
responsibility is damaging for societies, as the exercise of power becomes ever more
autocratic, even if all rituals of democratic politics are meticulously performed.
Arguably, the discrepancy between power and responsibility should be eroding
the authority of states, as Sennett (2006, p. 164) has argued. This, in turn, could be
expected to trigger a legitimation crisis of the system, and massive revolts. Yet, no
such crisis has so far ensued, apart from the wave of largely peaceful popular
protests in the course of 2011–2012 whose main theme is resistance to the politics of
austerity, rather than change of the political economy of Europe away from
neoliberal capitalism.
The lack of legitimation crisis is due to substantive changes of the social contract
(the legitimacy relationship) between public authority and citizens in Europe. Over
17 I owe the analogy between raison d’e´tat and raison d’e´conomie to my student Ce´cile Maitre-Ferri.
18 Directive 2006/123/EC was adopted by the European Parliament and Council on 12 December 2006.
19 The image of the Polish plumber as a symbol of cheap labour coming in from Eastern Europe appeared
in the press during the EU Constitutional referendum in 2005 in France.
20 Official Journal of the European Union, 23.2.2008, p. 10. In the Viking (EU06050291) and the Laval
(SE07060291) cases, the European Court of Justice was asked to clarify the relationship between the rules
on free movement, as protected in the European Community Treaty, and the fundamental rights of
workers to take collective action, including strike action.
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the past 20 years, this relationship has been altered to exclude distributional issues
from the range of political responsibility. Justifying neo-liberal economic policy
with the allegedly inevitable nature of globalisation, public authority has effectively
managed to redefine its relationship with citizens: market-regulative functions
linked to the provision of social rights (such as wealth redistribution and guaranteed
employment) have been withdrawn from this relationship. The matrix of state-
society relations over this period began to be shaped by a particular regulative
policy: one that consists in transferring responsibility from public authority to
individuals. Majone (1990) has observed that the neo-liberal state (which he names
‘regulatory state’) uses legal authority and regulation over other tools of
stabilisation and redistribution. The changed instruments of public policy also
entail change in the nature of that policy: as classical redistributive tools that had
previously offset the negative consequences of market dynamics are no longer
available, individuals are increasingly charged with responsibility for issues ranging
from maintaining a healthy lifestyle, to protection of the environment, remaining
employable, finding jobs and securing pensions. Thus, individual self-reliance has
become one of the core elements of the social contract in the early twenty-first
century.
This phenomenon is evidenced in analyses establishing that globalisation
weakens the connection between the national economy and citizens’ political
choice; economic openness reduces voter tendencies to hold incumbent policy
makers responsible for economic performance and, by default, for the social
consequences of economic policies.21 Such absolution of the state from its social
responsibility is asserted even via measures explicitly intended to enhance social
protection. Thus, the Charter on Shared Social Responsibilities that the Council of
Europe is now poised to adopt justifies the novel concept of sharing responsibilities
among various social actors with the fact that states are, allegedly, ‘less able to fulfil
their role of ensuring access to social protection’.22 There is no legitimacy crisis of
the system, no mass-scale revolts amidst the rampant economic crisis in advanced
liberal democracies, because the very legitimacy relationship has been altered to
exclude issues of social safety from the range of public authority’s responsibility.
The grievances against austerity that are now being expressed in street protests and
in voting booths are the grievances of distressed consumers; not of citizens
demanding structural changes to the political economy of democratic capitalism.
Not even leftist parties are proposing nationalisation of the essential economic and
financial infrastructure so as to ensure that public authorities secure resources for
social policy—resources other than borrowing and taxation, which are either
untenable or insufficient means for providing the needed funds.
The transfer of social responsibility to individuals entails that issues of social
justice withdraw from the legitimacy relationship, leave the agenda of public
debate, and thus stand beyond the scope of political contestation. Public authority is
21 As evidenced, for instance, in the comprehensive analysis of elections in 75 countries in Hellwig and
Samuels (2007).
22 Council of Europe. Draft recommendation of the Committee of the Ministers to member states on the




free to cause social harm for which it does not assume responsibility, as the same
general public which suffers these effects has absolved it from responsibility.
Democratic, responsive power has thus granted legitimacy to an irresponsible form
of rule. The state, ever more powerful, ever less responsible, remains invariably
legitimate.23
The Social Fallout: Fear of Freedom
One of the consequences of the altered social contract between public authority and
citizens is that the accrued personal freedom degenerates into mass anxiety. While
some have celebrated the growing individual responsibilisation that I discussed
above as a form of emancipation, as ‘turning collective requirements into individual
opportunities for choice’ (Beck 2007, p. 684), it is unlikely that individual
responsibility for wellbeing, in the context of the economic uncertainty that is
characteristic of globalisation, would nurture autonomy. For all the evidence, it is
feeding anxiety, thus engendering social pathologies rather than emancipation.
Autonomy that imposes an overwhelming burden of responsibility on individuals
for their well being quickly decays into what Erich Fromm called ‘fear of freedom’.
It is exactly because public authority is perceived as incapable of managing the
nebulous threats coming from a globally integrated world that this fear of freedom is
being channelled into hatred of strangers, rather than into demands for more social
protection.
This has resulted in the upsurge of a novel type of xenophobia, now fuelling mass
support to populist parties in Europe—what I have described elsewhere as
‘economic xenophobia’.24 In contrast to the old version, in which hostility to
foreigners was cast in terms of protection of cultural and political sovereignty
(national chauvinism), the foundation of xenophobia is now more explicitly
economic. It is related to perceived threats to socio-economic wellbeing (especially
job loss) brought about by the open border policies in the context of globalisation.
As fear of job outsourcing in the context of globalisation is becoming shared across
the working and middle classes, economic xenophobia has come to taint the
discourse equally of the centre-Left and the centre-Right.25
Significantly, the basis of this economic xenophobia is not impoverishment, and
neither is it the growing gap between rich and poor, as is commonly claimed. The
basis is economic insecurity: perceptions of threat to livelihood. Note, for instance,
that anti-immigration populist parties started to mobilise successfully in the affluent
23 For a more detailed account of the way the legitimacy relationship between public authority and
citizens has been reconfigured in Western democracies since the nineteenth century see Azmanova
(2013).
24 I introduce the notion economic xenophobia in Azmanova (2011).
25 Recent surveys corroborate this new, economic rather than cultural, foundation of xenophobia, as a
significant percentage of Europeans declare that the current level of immigration is spoiling the quality of
life by combining the (perceived) threat of jobs loss with pressures on the social security system and the
state education and health systems (according to a Harris poll published in the Financial Times, 6
September, 2010).
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nineties, in conditions of good economic growth and low unemployment, but
feeding on the sense of uncertainly that intensified globalisation was creating.
Despite the extraordinary prosperity that Europeans enjoyed in the late nineties, the
sense of anxiety and insecurity on an everyday level was steadily growing, fuelling
anxiety based on perceptions of physical insecurity, political disorder, cultural
estrangement, and employment insecurity (the ingredients of a new order-and-
security public agenda). Another indication of the fact that it is economic insecurity,
rather than impoverishment or inequality, that is driving what I have described as
‘economic xenophobia’, is that anti-immigrant parties are thriving in relatively rich
and egalitarian countries such as Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and
Finland.26
This is ushering in a novel political era in European politics. This era is shaped
by social anxiety, whose source is the perceived fragility of the model of wellbeing
and the incapacity of individuals, without the proper help of public authority to
assume the responsibilities forced upon them. As economic liberalism and
globalisation have come to be accepted in most advanced industrial democracies
as being without an alternative, citizens have began addressing public authority with
demands for compensation for the insecurity caused by globalisation. Such demands
for compensation range from curbing immigration, protection from ‘pandemics’,
increased safety in public spaces, blocking EU enlargement or, most brutally,
hostility to strangers.
Conclusion: Responsibility—Back to the State
The social question in the global twenty-first century emerges as the generalisation
of what the French have aptly called pre´carite´: the ‘incertitude’ of survival, which
haunts large groups of the population irrespective of educational level or social
class; problems which are neither rooted in the quality of democracy (as popular
self-government) nor in the organisation of sovereignty (located in nation-states or
surpassing them). It is not the invisible hand of the market that is generating the
anxieties haunting our societies. Behind the alleged inevitability of increased market
freedoms and decreased social protection stands a particular formula of policy-
making and style of the use of power that has been adopted by public authorities at
both the level of EU central institutions and member-states, irrespective of
governments’ nominal ideological affiliation. It consists in the growing powers of
public authorities to initiate policy with dramatic social consequences, but to
forsake responsibility for these consequences.
This pathological style of rule (the discrepancy between growing power and
reduced responsibility, a form of political ‘abocclusion’, to invoke the medical
pathology) has engendered two secondary disorders, or policy follies. The first one
is the economic policy of productivity-focused, jobless growth. This formula of
26 Thus, analysis has noted that the populist upsurge, which propelled to victory the xenophobic True
Finns Party in the 17 April 2011 national elections, had been brewing for years in Finland as decline in




supply-side economics, which prioritises the rapid increase in productivity for the
sake of competitiveness in the global economy, emerged already in the 1980s and
has been preserved throughout the recent jobless economic recovery. This formula
of economic policy generates insecurity even as it effectively generates growth. The
second disorder is the politics of individual responsibilisation that is turning
citizens’ declared right to the pursuit of happiness, dressed as social entrepreneur-
ship (we are all supposed to be the authors of our lives) into fear of freedom.
Therefore, one of the struggles to be launched against the politics of fear that is
haunting our societies would be to demand the social and economic responsibil-
isation of public authority vis-a`-vis citizens. Strategies of passive or active
resistance, subversion, or even radical obstruction (in the spirit of the recent rise in
anarchist activity in Europe), as much as they might be welcome as a needed wake-
up call for political authority, are not enough. The thing to do is to force public
authorities (at state and EU-level) to resume their social responsibility. Even if that
would mean bringing key economic and social infrastructure into public hands in
order to provide resources for social policy, this, for good or for bad, would hardly
entail the end of capitalism. It would only put an end to the socialisation of
economic risk and the privatisation of economic opportunity that are now tearing
the social fabric of European democracies.
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